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Abstract:

The introduction of immigrants from traditionally Islamic countries has created a new
dynamic within the Dutch social system. Seemingly clashing with the established facade
of Dutch “tolerance”, this group of Muslim immigrants has logically found a natural
enemy within right-wing political parties. However, on a more interesting level, we see
that the political agenda of the gay movement has seemingly converged with the agenda
of those right-wing groups. In a sense, this convergence of agendas seems odd
considering the general association of the gay movement with leftist, more progressive
political movements. This study intends to examine this convergence of agendas;
working from a basic theoretical design rooted in group identity and postmodern
perspectives on language. Through careful research into the realities of Dutch society, as
contrasted with apparent realities in American society, this study set out to create a
defensible argument for the assessment of this political alliance. The end-goal of this
study initially was to frame the convergence of agendas either within the context of
opportunism or within the context of genuine ideology. As the study progressed, it
became readily evident that, with a greater concept of Dutch society, the question of
opportunism seems to invoke its own relevance in the near future but not within the
current socio-political discourse in the Netherlands.
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Introduction
In the current American context, politics and social movements can
simultaneously be understood as formulating from two main camps or political parties:
the right-wing as represented by the Republican Party, and the Left-wing, as represented
by the Democratic Party. To a large extent, the discourse surrounding public policy is
one framed within the context structured by the two members of this political dichotomy.
Implicit within this dichotomous system is a convergence in the public subconscious of
certain issues, stances, approaches, beliefs, etc. The example of LGBT social movements
currently working within this system illuminates this reality. To any politically conscious
American, it seems intuitive to associate a gay agenda with the Democratic Party: borne
out of this two-party infrastructure, the progressive, left-wing, and socially-liberal
policies of the Democratic Party seem to invoke inclusivity with the cause of gay
emancipation. In essence, this bilinear political system has created a confluence of
different individual concepts and beliefs and has effectively streamlined opinion to a
conformist notion of discourse on many issues; as a result of this, it is a common notion,
in the American context, to associate gay with the political left. Moving from this
context to the arena of Dutch politics, it is seemingly counterintuitive to examine a
political convergence of agendas between right-wing parties and gay advocacy groups in
the Netherlands.
In the Dutch political arena, there is a coalition government which currently
consists of some ten or more parties. Moving forward with this in mind, it is important to
understand that there is a convergence of agendas between right-wing groups and the gay
community’s political representation. This truth is largely illuminated through the issue
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of Islamic, migrant communities within the Netherlands. In brief, a common enemy has
been realized by these right wing and gay factions in the realm of Dutch politics. For the
very clear rationale that many Islamic men and women hold traditionally conservative
sexual beliefs which are intrinsically anti-gay, it is easy to understand why the gay
movement, whose emancipation is all-but-concluded, is able to polarize with these new
migrants. In terms of the right-wing parties aligning behind a gay agenda, it is interesting
to note that they are invoking the gay demographic as a crucial element of their dialogue;
more specifically, the right-wing is utilizing the incongruence of homosexuality and
Islam in order to label the immigrants as somehow “backwards” or “uncivilized” because
of their stance towards the gay community. In general, this is a very original and
unexpected line of argumentation for an American student to hear from any right-wing
party: to invoke inclusiveness with the gay community in order to ostracize another
minority demographic. Coming from the American context, the immediate urge in this
instance is to label the right-wing parties involved in this move as insincere or
manipulatively opportunistic, ultimately recognizing that instance as troublesome for the
gay community; however, opportunism may be an unfairly foregone conclusion. The
goal of this project is thus quite clear: to define this political convergence and analyze the
motivations behind it. The end goal is to be able to make an educated and defensible
argument for why this alliance, from the right-wing side, is one rooted in genuine
ideology or mere political opportunism.
Concurrent with this study is the implicit explanation of the status quo regarding
the gay community within the larger Dutch society. While realization of full and true
emancipation is a foregone conclusion by many who see the procurement of the right to
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marry as the final step in the gay rights movement, many still argue that gays in the
Netherlands are still an ostracized community. As prominent gay activist and writer Gert
Hekma puts it, “the legal struggle for gay and lesbian rights may have ended, but the
much more difficult social battle for queer visibility has yet to begin (Hekma 2002, 240).
A necessary and base assumption in terms of this project is that the social identity of the
gay community is not yet concluded, there is still a good amount of debate as to whether
emancipation has actually been realized within the Dutch social context. Through the
definition and analysis of the aforementioned political convergence, it seems that a more
lucid and explicit definition of what the status of gays in Dutch society will be realized.
This newfound definition of Dutch society is going to be invoked when it comes time for
these players to rationalize and justify their stances.
Concurrent with any political movement is the necessity to justify that movement.
For example, in the USA, Mitt Romney will stand against a gay agenda and he will
justify that stance through an appeal to his Christian faith. Conversely, Dennis Kucinich
will appeal to a gay rights agenda and will justify that stance by citing a strong position
of fighting for social equality. Inherent in both of the justifications for these two different
stances is an implicit, if not explicit, definition of self. In both instances, both Romney
and Kucinich are utilizing this issue not merely to further an opinion or a cause (in large
part the success or failure of this movement is external to their lives) but in an effort to
define themselves to the public. In all instances of political discourse and stance-taking
there is an understood need to be heard, understood, and identified; this is a truth of any
democratic system which olds regular elections. In essence, when a right-wing party or a
gay advocacy group condemns the immigrants and calls them “backwards” they are in
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turn making the claim that they themselves are “not backwards” and will further clarify
the collective “they”.
That said it is imperative to understand the language and the stances taken by both
sides, the Dutch gay and the Dutch Right-Wing. Moreso than just a mere presence of
support or lack of support, it is imperative to recognize the justification and
rationalization for the stances taken by either side. In terms of the immigration issue,
through the stance articulated by some right-wing parties and the rationalization /
explanation of that stance, there is an explicitly stated definition of what it means to be
Dutch. As the language asserted by opponents to immigration labels the immigrants as
“non-Dutch” or outsiders, there is a very candid sense of meticulous exclusivity involved
with this political phenomenon. This report intends to examine this alliance by
understanding the stated positions of the party and the stated explanations of the party or
group for why that stance is held. Through this process it will be easier to gain a sense of
how the gay community and the right-wing community regard each other. Moving past
that, this study also intends to understand how these attitudes are manifested through
public policy and ultimately affect situations in reality.
The first section of the study is intended to most clearly and lucidly define the
seminal moments from the last century regarding progress for the gay emancipation
movement in the Netherlands. Implicit to this entire study, and to Dutch culture, is a
sense that the history of the gay movement wholly informs the current reality in day-today life for the Dutch gay community. Moving from this base of historical knowledge,
this study will then apply that sense of history in an effort to describe and understand this
current phenomenon of the right-wing championing the gay cause. While it is tempting
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to relegate any and all politicians to the role of an opportunist, it is important to try and
come to a researched conclusion about how candid a politician or party truly is. Another
extremely important dimension when analyzing politics is to understand how social
reality is separated from party stance; that is to say, a politician can say anything and that
may have some material affect, but more importantly than what any political party may
say, it is imperative to examine what they actually accomplish; for example, if you only
study the rhetoric of General Idi Amin Dada, the brutal dictator of Uganda, your
conclusions are going to be much less relevant than if you’d studied his actual
achievements. In the Dutch context, it is important not only to understand how these
parties define and understand themselves and the others involved with the phenomenon,
but it is also imperative to make a calculated assessment of the political strategy involved
and how it is manifested. What exactly is the social climate from which this political
alignment emerges? What exactly is the conflict between “Islam” and “gay”, who is
defining it, and how is it defined? How fairly is this conflict presented to the Dutch
electorate? In essence, it is a common fact that political parties exist for the sole purpose
of perpetuating themselves and their agendas; however, the methods of doing so vary
based upon a party’s sense of honesty and strategy. The goal in this study is to gain a
sense of whether or not the right-wing is making a calculated guess at how best to combat
the immigration movement and is merely using the gay community as a political puppet,
or if the right-wing is recognizing the gay community as part of the Dutch society and is
coming together in a representation of newfound nationalism.
Before addressing any of these issues, this report first intends to describe briefly
the relevant theoretical line of argumentation which informs the mindset involved with
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this study. Largely rooted within the context of the conflict paradigm of sociology, this
study will synthesize postmodern perspectives on language with modern theories of
sociological deviance and will draw upon the theories of Lewis Coser and other theorists
of group identity formation. Secondly, this study will briefly summarize the history of
the gay community in the Netherlands. Next, this study intends to examine both the
stances of right-wing parties and the sociopolitical context from which they arise.
Building upon the groundwork established through a respective academic nod to group
formation, group identity, and the historical development of the gay emancipation
movement, this study will then analyze and formulate an educated and defensible
statement as to the nature of the relationship between the gay community and the rightwing political community. In this study, the intention is to define the nature of this
political convergence in order to illuminate realities about the social conditions in the
Netherlands; through the careful observation of this political alliance it should be possible
to make an educated assertion about how it specifically informs the current status of the
gay community in the Netherlands
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Theoretical Framework
In general, this report is very interested in the methods with which group identity
is formed. In-groups and out-groups of society are imperative descriptions for
understanding this political phenomenon within the Dutch context. At present, there are
a number of arguments circulating the general social discourse in the Netherlands which
pit certain groups as the “norm” and other as “not the norm”. Working within this
framework, the crux of this report is to nail down these labels and understand both who is
applying them and how these labels are manifested in determining reality as understood
through the creation of public policy.
In a very broad sense, one of the best schools of thought with which to examine
political phenomena is the sociological paradigm of conflict. Within this discipline,
conflict is understood as “a relationship between two or more parties… who believe they
have incompatible goals”; it is also important to understand that “the presence of
‘incompatible goals’ is a precondition for conflict, and that conflict results when there is
a perceived opportunity for goal obstruction” (Beck 60). Rooted in a basic adherence to
Marxist philosophy, this paradigm was initially utilized to understand how power
relations worked between the ruling class and the working class (Turner 619). In
understanding the ways in which the sociological paradigm defines conflict, it is an
exigent point to realize that the goals involved in conflict theory are self-ascribed. That is
to say, if goals assigned by the individual parties and the incongruency of these goals to
each other represents a conflict, then conflict is to be understood as a conscious
formulation between the two or more opposed parties. This crucial point of self-ascribing
conflict is essential to the aims of this study, as the conflict being created between the gay
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community and the migrant community is a newly developed conflict and very pertinent
to an examination of semantics. In essence, this viewpoint is moving from the base
concept that, despite how imminent a conflict between immigrants and these two sects of
Dutch society maybe, this conflict is most assuredly being defined, shaped, and to a
certain extent created by those two sects of Dutch society.
In examining the theories of Lewis A. Coser, we see an expounding upon basic
conflict theory with a specific concentration towards the notion of functionability.
Specifically, Coser examines the ways in which conflict is manifested into functionability
through the assignment of deviance as a label. According Coser, the group doing the
labeling assigns itself as the “normal” party and it assigns another group as the “deviant”
party or the party that is not normal; this effort of labeling is understood as a catalyst to
either weaken or strengthen the labeling party, generally the intention of labeling another
group as ‘deviant” is done so in order to strengthen the party that is doing the labeling
(Coser 173). Also, this theory does assume the cognizance of the labeling party, that the
party is fully aware that by labeling another group as “deviant” they stand to either
weaken or strengthen themselves. While it may seem a bit intuitive, it is crucial to
remember that the question of how the labeling group defines itself is just as important as
how it labels and defines the deviant group. For example, if the gay community was to
say, “Muslims are backwards and their philosophies run counter to the philosophies of
the Dutch gay community which we adhere to”, that statement would be quintessentially
different from the assertion that “Muslims are backwards and their philosophies run
counter to the philosophies of the native Dutch community which we adhere to”. In both
instances, the gay community is labeling the migrant population as deviant; however, in
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the former instance, the gay community defines itself merely as a conglomeration of gay
people in the Netherlands, whereas in the latter instance, the gay community defines itself
as part of the collective “native Dutch” and is thus making a statement about what it
considers “native Dutch” to be.
An unspoken and underlying assumption which informs the theoretical basis of
this study is a basic adherence to the conclusions of postmodern theorists in terms of how
they understand the functionability and power of semantics. In essence, while theorists
like Barrett and Nicholson may have been making very intricate and complicated
observations and claims, they created their theories with basic adherence to a cognizance
towards the Althusserian paradigm which states that discourse creates the subject
(Dasgupta). In terms of semantics, language is thus understood less in terms of meaning
and more in terms of “doing” (Dasgupta). For this specific study, the reference to
postmodern perspectives is to lend credence to the power of labeling and the creation of
reality through language. This system of thought seeks to dispel any notion that the
labeling party or the labeled party is in any way external to the implications of the label
itself. In a sense, the act of labeling is understood as a contribution to a shift in discourse
which fosters the incorporation or exclusion of the message of the label into the realm of
social reality. To be clearer, if right-wing parties are to label the immigrant population as
“deviant”, the act of labeling does more than just represent the opinions of these
politicians; in a sense, the act of labeling fosters in a greater attitude in the general society
which considers the possibility that the immigrant population could be “deviant”. For
this report, the appeal to postmodernist thought is merely a way to clarify that act of
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labeling is significant and powerful in the sense that a discourse is created which has realworld implications.
Moving from this theoretical base which seeks to understand the functionability
and implications of in-group/ out-group relations, we can begin to discuss the dynamics
involved with the convergence of the political agendas between the gay community and
the right-wing political factions operating within the Dutch political system. However,
moving forward with this theoretical framework would be incomplete without a cursory
understanding of the history of the evolution of the gay emancipation movement in the
Netherlands.
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Defining the current landscape of the Gay Community

In order to fully understand the dimensions and implication of this extant political
alliance, it is imperative to retain at least a cursory sense of history in terms the larger gay
movement towards emancipation. With either side of this alliance, this study resolves to
clearly identify and understand the methods in which and through which they define both
themselves and others. While party positions are part of a larger social reality which is so
complex that it is best described in its current state, the history of the gay community
much more readily informs its own social status in the present. However, in terms of the
gay community, it is currently difficult to pinpoint the current identity and role it assumes
within Dutch society, as there is an ongoing dialogue which is still unable to resolve this
question. Thus, an appeal to the major historical developments of the past century is
crucial to grasping a better understanding of what it currently means to be a gay person in
the Netherlands.
In terms of the Gay emancipation movement in the Netherlands, to be thorough it
is important to examine this community’s evolution from the beginning of the 20th
century up until the present day. In the time preceding the 20th century, Dutch laws and
public policy were largely the result of “liberal legislation under the influence of the
French Napoleonic code” (Krouwel 161). With the movement into the 20th century, we
see an emergence of powerful, Christian political parties in the Netherlands. Consisting
of a conglomeration of Catholic and Orthodox protestant constituencies, these parties
adopted a self-mandated agenda of “maintaining morality” and passed legal provision
248 in 1911; this provision effectively changed the age of sexual consent to 21 for
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homosexuals while 16 remained the age of consent for heterosexuals (Out in the
Netherlands 22). Dubbed the “confessional parties”, these religious factions retained a
majority in the Dutch coalition-style government from 1909 up until 1967 (Krouwel 159).
More than just dominating the political arena, these confessional parties had an
influence which pervaded everyday society and largely contributed to the creation of
“verzuiling” or the Dutch system of pillarization. Academic Geert Mak describes how
this system manifested itself in Dutch society in a lecture given at Harvard in 2006:
In the small provincial town I grew up in, I went to a Protestant school – the newspaper, the
university where my brothers studied, the football club, the scouts, the baker and the milkman
were Protestant too. Even the leaves on the trees were. I sometimes thought, ‘The world of my
uncle, who was a socialist and taught at the local state school, looked the same, only he bought
his bread at the socialist co-op, and the leaves on the trees looked slightly different to him too.’
Yet, there was no problem ruling the country. The elites at the top of the pillars made continual
compromises with each other. Such was the tradition of what is called the Polder Model. The
system as a whole functioned as a very effective pacification machine in this religiously divided
country, and, at the same time, created a national community which seemed much more tolerant
than it really was, because people simply looked away from each other.

In essence, the prevalence of religion, moreso than any other ideological presence,
determined the social reality of the Netherlands in the early to mid-20th century by
instigating a society in which the most mundane of activities were defined through a
person’s religious and ideological background. It is a key point to conceptualize that the
gay movement in the Netherlands up until the 1960s functioned within this context of a
religiously-defined political and social climate.
In the years leading up to the second world war, the Dutch Gay emancipation
movement was chiefly represented through the NWHK which was founded in 1911 after
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the passing of provision 248 and was largely modeled after the WHK gay party in
Germany (Out in the Netherlands 22). In the postwar years, the gay movement was
represented by the Shakespeare Club which was started in late 1946 and quickly renamed
the Cultural and Recreational Center (the COC) (Out in Netherlands 23). In general, the
goals of the COC were initially very confined to the limits of the social reality borne out
of the pillar system. Rather than vying for visibility, the COC worked somewhat behindthe-scenes and concentrated on lobbying important social and political figures (Krouwel
162). In the 1950s, Dutch society placed great value in the fields of social work and
psychiatry, and working from a religious basis some of these intellectual clergymen and
social workers were courted by the COC (Krouwel 163). It was in this process that the
COC was successful in creating a dialogue, albeit very conforming, yet nonetheless a
dialogue between the gay community and prominent members of Dutch society and
movements. It is imperative to understand that the creation of this dialogue stipulated
conformation to bourgeois standards of a religiously-defined context of Dutch society,
and the efforts of the COC were not aimed at righting inherent “wrongs” in Dutch society
but instead were aimed at integrating homosexuals into that society.
From the start of the 1960s onward, the larger Dutch society saw a movement in
the progressive direction. In what is now understood as the “depillarization” of Dutch
society, there was a vast conglomeration of interrelated social changes which took place.
The most significant and basic indication of social change was the increasing lack of faith
placed in religion. Between 1960 and 1986 Church attendance dropped from 90% to
26%, and from 1967 to 1989 religious affiliation among Dutch citizens dropped from
80% to 46% (Krouwel 160). It is even noted that the religious institutions in the
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Netherlands at the time began to implement much more progressive policies and attitudes
to adapt to this growing progressivism: in 1958 Catholic priests opened a help center for
homosexuals and published a pamphlet which essentially encouraged the acceptance of
homosexuals by straight people; in 1961, Protestant groups published a similar pamphlet
themselves (Out in Netherlands 24). Also important during this time was the activation
and establishment of influential student work groups who emphasized a much more
radical, left-wing approach to gay emancipation. Working externally to the COC, these
groups ushered in a new mentality which rejected the historical pattern of conformation
and sought to identify the homosexual community as both different and positive for being
different (Krouwel 163). Initially resistant to this new methodology of reaching
emancipation the COC eventually adopted this more left-wing, progressive approach to
conceptualizing the gay community within the larger Dutch context and it was legally
recognized by left-wing Den Uyl administration in 1973 (Krouwel 164).
In the coming years, this new, left-wing, progressive movement garnered much
success for their constituency which precipitated further legislative progress for the
Dutch gay community. In 1971, provision 248 was abolished, in 1974, the ban on gays in
the military was lifted, and in 1981 “persecution on the grounds of homosexuality was
recognized as grounds for asylum” (Out in Netherlands 25). In 1979, taking a cue from
the American system of holding pride parades, the Netherlands held Roze Zaterdag
(“Pink Saturday”) which would become a tradition of garnering visibility that, while
incorporating less and less political goals in the coming years, continued to create fervor
for the visibility of the gay community in the Netherlands. Consequently, the increase in
public visibility also brought forth the willingness to disclose an aversion to these
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policies within the remaining opponents of the gay emancipation movement.
Culminating at a demonstration in Amersfoort, the gay demonstrators were attacked and
pelted with stones by onlookers while the police did nothing to protect the demonstrators.
While in itself a grizzly affair, the events at Amersfoort were significant in that they
galvanized a political movement in favor of furthering gay equality through legislation.
Culminating in the Equal Treatment Law in 1994, this seminal event also coincidentally
marked the first year that traditional confessional parties, which existed as the key
remaining opponents to gay emancipation, were not part of the coalition government. In
April of 2001 the first gay marriages were performed, and gay couples were given the
right to adopt children; in 2003 that law was elaborated upon to include adopting children
from abroad (Out in the Netherlands 27).
As you can see from this brief history of the Dutch gay movement in the 20th
century, there was a considerable shift from incorporating and conforming to a
bourgeoisie society characterized by a fervent religious majority to a very leftist,
progressive approach to demanding equality. While this approach did incur some pitfalls,
for example the COC of 1947 would never have allowed the violence at Amersfoort to
have taken place, in general it was seemingly the right political maneuver as gays in the
Netherlands have been enjoying more legislative equality than nearly all other gay
communities in countries elsewhere for many years now. In today’s Holland, we now see
right-wing parties aligning behind the cause of gay safety and gay rights in order to
articulate an anti-migrant stance. In essence, it is now imperative to define the current
sociopolitical arena and try to figure out why this political alignment is possible.
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Methodology / Assumptions and Limitations:

Through intensive research the first half of this report was intended to give the
reader a general grasp of the motives of the research and the general puzzle which is
being solved here. Through an appeal to mainly scholarly literature, there was a quick
nod to the relevant theories of deviance and labeling which inform the basis of my study.
Next, it was imperative to define the gay movement historically and understand how even
moreso than representing a successful emancipation, this movement largely illuminated
an even bigger trend and pattern which manifested itself within Dutch society. Through
depillarization and secularization, as illuminated through the tribulations of the gay
emancipation, we see an emergence of a new kind of Dutch society to be examined and
defined within the proceeding section of the study. The decision not to provide even a
preliminary backdrop of history for the different political parties involved was intentional
and the result of an effort to refrain from overcomplicating the data presented and adhere
to conciseness; conversely, the importance of incorporating a historical perspective of the
gay emancipation movement was important because it readily illuminates the historical
incongruence between the gay community and the right-wing community.
In the second half of this paper, field research consisting mainly of personal
interviews seeks to illuminate the current reality. In this section, it will first be
imperative to note the current state of discourse in Dutch society. As described and
illuminated through field interviews with accomplished academics closely tied to issues
of politics and gay rights, this is an essential point to understand how the context of
Dutch society wholly informs this specific phenomenon I am studying. In essence, what
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is described is a notion that there exists a ‘moral majority of the left’, an intricate look
into the validity of the right-wing rhetoric, and then some conclusions dealing with my
initial goal of uncovering possible opportunism on the part of right-wing parties. Even
beyond attempting to answer this question of opportunism, the analytical section of this
paper intends to reexamine the relevance of the basic research question and see whether,
with a complete understanding of the Dutch cultural system, it still applies.
While attempting to remain balanced I did want to get a varied perspective on this
situation by interviewing people very close to the issue, so an effort was enacted to reach
those removed enough from the political realities so that they could assess it intelligently.
It is inherent to note that no matter who was interviewed, their own personal bias will
penetrate their answers and pervade my conceptualization of information; this section of
the report intends to inform the reader as to whom I spoke with and what their personal
biases may be. The first person I spoke to was Gert Hekma, a professor of gay and
lesbian studies at the University of Amsterdam. Largely intelligent, well-read, and
extremely well-versed in the status of the gay community of the Netherlands, Gert does
represent a very extreme, left-wing view of politics and the gay movement in general.
Jan Willem Duyvendak, a professor of sociology at the University of Amsterdam seemed
to represent a very centrist position and embody a general critique of the situation which
seemed very removed from personal bias; he has written extensively on gay issues, and
he has a firm grasp of how social movements are manifested. David Bos is a professor at
the International School of the University of Amsterdam; similar to Jan Willem,
Professor Bos also seemed to embody that mentality of a skeptical professor with an
adherence to rationality rather than emotion. Joyce Hamilton is a member of the COC
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executive board; however, she seemed to represent the most centrist, skeptical, and
reality-based account of the situation Mattias Duyves has been engulfed in gay politics
for many years now, and on this project his views functioned as the most historically
cognizant and researched opinions that were encountered. Also, as acting advisor and
quoted interviewee, Andre Krouwel represented more of a challenging college professor
than a man with opinions; nonetheless, Dr. Krouwel’s knowledge is extensive and to a
large extent guided me and consistently challenged my thought processes, helping me to
craft the most honest and true study possible. In general, I was surpised to encounter
such skepticism from my interviewees in terms of my question about the motivations of
the political right-wing. In general, my sample demographic for interviews could be
understood as representing a scholarly (and generally left-wing) conceptualization of
Dutch society; however, at every point, there was a near-constant hesitance to make any
generalizations or overarching conclusions, and there was a constant effort to challenge
the conventional answer to any question posed.
In terms of this study it was imperative to clarify my own background and to
illuminate this Dutch situation through the lens of my own historical context in the
American realm in order to be completely candid about my own possible bias. Another
limitation of course, which is referenced above, is the fact that this is not an extensively
quantitative research paper and surely my discussions, analysis, and conclusions are
framed in the context defined by my sample crowd that I spoke with. Especially in
dealing with issues of sexuality and gender, it is very difficult to find educated people in
these fields who are personally removed from the topic at hand; that is to say most people
working in the field have some sort of personal connection to the study which invigorates
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their passions on the matter. I do believe I was fortunate enough to come across
individuals who were careful to be skeptical and were very honest about their personal
connection to the subjects at hand, which did allow me to be as objective as possible in
understanding my research; however, it is still naive to conclude that a personal bias did
not engender my conceptualizations which followed.
Another limitation of this study was simply the scope of it all. At many times
during the project it became readily apparent to me that this political situation could
inform a myriad of different subjects and that it would be very easy to elaborate and use
this situation as the catalyst for writing an entire book about Dutch society. Many of the
conclusions were very encompassing and embodied so many key, cornerstone differences
between Dutch society and American society. That said, at times it was extremely
difficult to maintain a concise focus on what I looked to accomplish; I constantly
attempted to re-evaluate what I was asking and what I was looking for. In the end, this
led me to conclude that this study is best understood through the paradigm of the gay
community’s status and how this particular situation functions specifically in regards to
that demographic group. In doing so, I was able to make some basic observations and
realizations which inform the current status of Dutch society and specifically influence
the relationship between the gay community and the right-wing community.
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Analysis

Moral Majority of the Left

“If you want to understand the very peculiar, very particular situation in Holland, you have to
understand that this is not a moral majority of the right as you have in the US, this is a moral
majority of the left or not of the left but of progressive people or of people that are progressive
regarding certain topics, and very much about sex and gender. So the right-wing political parties in
fact have moved to the left and that makes it for people who have been voting for the left more
easy to vote now for right-wing parties” – Jan Willem Duyvendak

The first basic conclusion of this ISP project which became readily apparent
during the first interview and was reinforced through subsequent interviews is that in
order make a calculated and defensible assessment of this particular political situation in
the Netherlands, it is imperative to define the social context through which it arises. In a
sense, this specific ISP question and puzzle is largely defined and influenced by a context
which is foreign to the thought processes which emerge from a background in the
American social and political discourse; the basic truth that a right-wing ideology simply
would not support a gay agenda in the United States seems intuitive. This first section of
the analytical portion of this report intends to synthesize the views expressed during the
field interviews and contrast those testimonies with the realities of the American political
and social system in a larger effort to expose the preeminent realities in Dutch society
which can shed light upon this political convergence of agendas in the Netherlands.
In the United States, an unwritten social law which defines the concepts of
political correctness, moral justification, and many aspects of public policy is deeply
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rooted in a fundamental adherence to the topical definition of Judeo-Christian philosophy.
Remember that while religion is a powerful motivating factor, it is but one of a number of
factors which informs the decisions of the American electorate. However, in terms of
representative salience, it is impossible to dispute the reality that religion is one of the
most pervasive elements in affecting political decision-making within the American
context. In terms of the American electorate, according to recent survey data, the United
States ranks as one of those most religious industrialized nations in the world, where a
large majority of its citizens identify as Christian (US Census Bureau). Conversely, the
Netherlands is at the other end of the religiosity spectrum and historically has seen a vast
decline in religious affiliation and church attendance over the past half century; the latest
US Government statistics list the church membership of the Netherlands at 30%, whereas
only half of those people regularly attend church (Netherlands Religious Freedom
Report). These statistics seem to imply a very plausible possibility concerning what
motivates American voting behavior. However, even more important than a direct link
between religious affiliation/beliefs and voting behavior is the manner in which the
religiosity in the USA affects the overall social discourse which then affects voting
behavior. A side note, religion and religiosity, in the context of this study, are understood
as representative invocations of justifications expressed strictly within a political realm;
for example, this concept of religion encompasses influential characters like Jerry Falwell,
but it does not encompass cult members or other religiosity which is largely irrelevant to
the overall political discourse. Specifically in dealing with the gay emancipation
movement in the states, it is very simple to understand how religion is able to enter, affect,
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and ultimately determine the social dialogue concerning this topic and the affective
realities as enacted through public policy.
In terms of the American debate on whether or not gays deserve equal rights in
terms of the marriages that their heterosexual neighbors get to enjoy, the argument is
presented as one between two sides: a ‘moral majority of the political right’, and a fringe
group of gays, lesbians, and their friends who are organized in protest. Instead of a
debate about human rights, which the gay emancipation issue seems to largely address,
the ‘moral majority of the right’ reshapes the issue into a semantic pissing match about
the meaning of the word “marriage”; this the line of argumentation asserts that, “if we let
gays marry we are betraying the historically sacred definition of marriage”. First off, this
argumentation is laughably ridiculous because marriage, in the American context, is not
historically defined and is only sacred to the extent that less than half of marriages
actually work in the States; also keep in mind that half a century ago this same line of
argumentation was effectively used to prevent whites and blacks from marrying in many
American states. However, even more important than the logical shortcomings of the
American right-wing’s line of argumentation is the realization that this ‘moral majority of
the right’, which is not unintelligent, must know that their arguments aren’t as compelling
as their adversaries’; however, the arguments don’t have to be and they understand that.
American religiosity is extremely well concentrated and well organized, even to the
extent that it is not uncommon to hear an evangelical minister refer to his parish as his
“troops” who are ready to “mobilize” at the whim of the leader. In this sense, a sizable
portion of the American electorate is essentially controlled and acting under a mandate
which, despite any disingenuous intentions (which a vast number of right-wing American
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Christian leaders seem to have in large supply), derives from the higher concept of God,
and specifically the malleable Judeo-Christian concept of God. To compare and contrast,
we see a similar motivating factor which is even more pervasive and instilled within the
minds of the Dutch electorate; however, it is most certainly not religion.
Sociologically it would be fair to characterize this religious phenomenon in the
States as representative of a certain passion or a certain common point which invigorates
and stimulates a wide sector of the public. This common point of stimulation, religiosity,
seems absent within the Dutch social system, so a logical conclusion would be the
assumed apathy of the Dutch electorate; however, this is an incomplete assessment.
According to recent research on voter turnout in these two respective countries, the
Netherlands boasts much higher numbers of voter turnout than does the United States
(Voter Turnout Information). Now, assuming that voter turnout is a logical assessment of
the strength of moral convictions of a given electorate, this incongruence of voter-turnout
seems to assess that the Dutch are in fact more active and motivated by their convictions
than the equivalent American electorate, but what is it that motivates the Dutch society to
vote in such higher numbers? Also, more important than that, in terms of the gay
emancipation issue, what ideology informs the 89% of the Dutch electorate to feel and
vote the same way about the issue of homosexuality (Out in the Netherlands)?
To compare these described “moral majorities” (keep it mind that the term
“majority” is not applied in relation to the general public necessarily), especially on the
issue of gay emancipation, it is clearly evident that the Dutch moral majority is much
more formidable and encompassing than the American ‘moral majority of the right’. In
the states, it is true that the ‘religious right’ has been able to define the discourse on gay
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marriage and many other social issues; however, they do not enjoy support from an
overwhelming majority of society, and in large part their views are seen as extreme by
most people who would identify themselves as Democrats, about half of the American
voting electorate. Conversely, the Dutch majority, some 89% of the Dutch electorate, do
support gay rights and vote accordingly (Out in Netherlands).
Within the Dutch context, this so-called ‘moral majority of the left’ seems to be
more inclusive and less questioned, and their views on gay rights seem somehow
cemented into the public discourse. This ‘moral majority of the left’, which seems to
describe the overwhelming majority of natural-born Dutch citizens, at least in terms of
the gay community, is mainly defined through an adherence to progressive, left-wing
ideology of moving forward through change to tradition. One of the easiest and the most
relevant ways for this study to substantiate that claim is through reference to the gay
community in the Netherlands. The situation regarding the gay emancipation movement
largely underscores an even bigger shift in the overall sense of position and subsequent
policy within the Netherlands. As professor Jan Willem Duyvendak puts it:
Even the Christian Union, who is member of parliament, they are orthodox protestant people, they
have an enormous debate in their own circles, I mean they’re like the TV right-wing people in the
US, they are as [extreme] as the evangelicals; so they have in fact a lot of evangelicals in the
political party and they are forced now because they are a member of this coalition cabinet to
discuss about homosexuality, and now the leader said just last week that they are not a party that
wants to discriminate anybody; so now even that political party seems to be in favor of equal
rights of gays and lesbians

In a system where even the most radical right-wing party themselves can have a leader
who comes out in strong support of a gay rights agenda, it would seem readily evident
that a larger movement has somehow disrupted the Dutch social discourse from the very
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different situation existing within its American counterpart, at least in terms of gay rights.
Now before we conclude that native-Dutch society is an amnesty-prone, all-including
group towards gay people, it is important to realize that there is a manifestation of antigay sentiment which does arise within this Dutch political context and seems external t
the rhetoric on the incongruencies between Islam and homosexuality. As Professor
Andre Krouwel puts it:
Here you have the Orthodox Protestants who are also anti-gay-emancipation. In fact, I was on
television today discussing this; members of the Christian Union, one of the smaller parties in the
coalition government, had actually a few people in their ranks that also now call upon all gay
people being thrown out of public office. It’s the kind of argument that ‘you can’t be an
upstanding citizen and be gay’. It’s funny because it is [the American] mainstream Republican
view, and here it is an extremist, Orthodox-Protestant fringe within the Christian Union.

There are two important points to recognize here. First, it is important to
understand that the Christian Union does not hold political clout anymore and does now
function as a fringe party within the current coalition government. A second and much
more crucial point is that, even beyond the fact that there is debate about gay rights
within this Orthodox-Protestant community, this rhetoric does not enter the larger public,
discourse – on the surface, their political leader just proclaimed that gay equality was a
necessity. As Gert Hekma puts it, “Despite the fact that 20% of the public is against gay
marriage and 30% is against gay and lesbian adoption, the [anti-gay] rhetoric is not very
vocal, the hate language, which still exists, has moved from the homosexuals to the
pedophiles”. It is so imperative to understand the notion that even the idea of publicly
representing anti-gay sentiment within the current Dutch society is a complete faux pas;
even the most fringe, conservative party which you would expect to encompass anti-gay
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rhetoric at its harshest has curbed its language and even seems to be internally torn on the
issue. That said, in terms of examining the gay emancipation movement in the
Netherlands, this sense of progressivism is extremely pervasive and does to an almost
total extent define the nature of social dialogue on the subject. With respect to the
American system which is influenced by religiosity, this Dutch moral majority seems
have its views informed by a progressive and much more pervasive ideology which has
truly taken root, especially with regards to gay emancipation.
Now, as a clarifying point, it is also extremely relevant to understand that this
moral majority of the left, in terms of this report, is being evaluated based upon the
surface-level attitudes, and this notion of 89% of the Dutch-native population is
troublesome. The issue which arises with this statistic is that there is little differentiation
between support and tolerance; when you ask that same 89% further questions about
specific situations and gay rights, that number does drop a little. As described by Joyce
Hamilton, a member of the COC party which solely represents a gay agenda:
In a way yes, there is a wide variety in how [all the] parties actively want to assert a [pro-gay]
stance. Very clearly, for example, the Christian Democrats Party (CDA) is silently supportive,
meaning that they won’t open up the debate about civil marriage for gay people anymore, that’s a
given, that’s a law, so they won’t open up a discussion about that anymore. They won’t question
it any longer because that’s the reality, but that doesn’t mean that they actively set up their policies
to increase safety or whatever for the LGBT people

As you can see, there is a sense by those within the political scene that perhaps their
views aren’t being truly supported but are being tolerated. However, this is a seminal
point to emphasize: even if support is manifested in varying levels of conviction (the
spectrum from full-fledged activism to passive agreement), the fact still remains that
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opposition to gay rights from the native Dutch population is all but silenced within the
modern public forum. Immediately, the concern from the perspective of gay
emancipation is that somehow tolerance poses a threat to the gay community; in brief, it
is certainly less assuring to a gay person that their way of life is tolerated rather than
supported. To follow that point, this initial reality makes one weary of concluding
progress for the gay community. However, in looking at the most recent changes in
Dutch politics, Hamilton proceeds to illuminate how the current coalition government
differs from the last:
The last government, it was a conservative government with the PVV and the CDA and D66 and
somehow they just did not take LGBT rights or emancipation into account at all; there was a state
secretary who was responsible for coordinating LGBT emancipation issues, and she literally didn’t
do anything at all. Within the current coalition, the bigger and smaller Christian parties such as
the Christian Union, they have the very clear break with the past governments; there is a minister
from the Labor party who is very aware of LGBT issues and has written an important policy
document about that, and he’s already said he will have a budget allocated to that, which is a
significant step

In general, this shift of coalition governments represents another movement in the overall
progressive, left-wing movement of the Dutch society. Regardless of any passivity and
subsequent analysis of passivity in regards to right-wing parties, the movement, at least in
terms of the gay emancipation, seems to still be moving forwards in the vein of a
progressive moral ideology and has increasingly less obstacles blocking its way. It is
exorbitantly important to clarify that anti-gay rhetoric has been continually abating and
now is not necessarily seen as emerging from the native Dutch population within the
current social dialogue.
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In general, a synthesis of the historical evolution of the gay movement and this
basic concept of the surface of the current political climate with specific attention to that
same movement seems to fulfill the prerequisite base of knowledge from which to
examine the convergence of political agendas. To move forward from this general base
of preliminary analysis, it is thus important to understand how the right-wing is aligning
behind the gay movement: what are these groups saying and how does that compare with
the realities experienced by the gay community?
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The Rhetoric of the Right-Wing and National Identity

Essentially, for reasons to be further elaborated on, a good portion of the Dutch
population does feel threatened by the presence of a Muslim immigrant population,
especially in Amsterdam. In large part the rhetoric used by those who are against the
presence of these migrants is an applied effort to label these communities as “backwards”
or “repressive”. Not surprisingly the situation with gay emancipation is used as a catalyst
to illuminate this viewpoint. As the legal status of the gay community in the Netherlands
exists as one of the most progressive sexual realities of any world state, and since this
situation also seems to conflict with the generic notion of homosexuality coming from an
Islamic context, the issue of gay emancipation serves as an extremely salient point to
illuminate discrepancy of culture. As the status of the gay community is generally
regarded as a proud social achievement for the Dutch (they are regarded as the “ultimate
Dutch” according to Jan Willem Duyvendak), clearly the discrepancy to be drawn here is
one carrying a negative connation for the migrant communities.
In relative terms it is essential to understand the symbolic representations of both
the Dutch gay community and the view of the migrant populations to the larger Dutch
public. Whereas the gay community represents a movement associated with
depillarization, secularization, and progressivism, the immigrant communities are
continually labeled and associated with a stall to progress; they even invoke a sense of
reversion to past experiences with religiosity that remain fondly unremembered by the
native Dutch. Associated with a strong connection to religiosity, to many Dutch people
the immigrant communities exist as “memories of the fifties of the past century” as Jan
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Willem Duyvendak puts it. As prominent authority on gay issues Mattias Duyves
explains it:
Here in the Netherlands we created, not by principle only, but by the course of history we created
an advanced kind of national identity in which discrimination is an official taboo, which means it's
a normative concept that binds us. We are different from the Americans with their religious stuff
and we are different from the Muslims and we are different from the East Block because we are
Dutch and that binds us together… this is why right-wing leaders like Gert Wilders and other
leaders are afraid that other groups will bite it away, such as the migrants…

Whereas Duyves will confidently recognize the existence of a national Dutch identity that
is very cognizant of its own social history, Jan Willem Duyvendak will frame the current
situation a little differently. In attempting to portray the way that the Dutch society
understands itself, Duyvendak represents the situation as an internal debate:
Nationalism, anyways, it is in relation to the integration debate and the multiculturalism debate
which gets at the question, ‘who are the ‘real Dutch’ nowadays? And that is exactly the
polarization moment, so the ‘real Dutch’ now includes the gays, lesbians, and feminists as part of
the ‘real Dutch’, and their status as the ‘real Dutch’ is being used to marginalize the Muslims. And
that is also why, recently when you were already here there was so much upheaval about the report
published on national identity and they said well national identity does not exist, there is not one
identity in Holland, and then the Princess Maxima also made the same statement, and she was
enormously attacked by the right because the right-wing political parties want to have one national
identity, and that [identity] is that we are all equal and we all have equal rights as men, women,
gays and lesbians, and once more that is so surprising because ten years ago that would not have
been part of our national identity; but if you have a somewhat more positive reasoning you can say
that anyways, well its good for the gays and lesbians and men and women that equal rights is “in”.
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In general, the right-wing rhetoric seems to be characterized by an adherence to the
notion that native-Dutch culture is the best and they are playing up the notion that the
migrant communities not only differ, but represent a threat to the existence of that nativeDutch population. In a large sense, the interviewed subjects and regular interaction with
members of Dutch culture lend credence to the notion that there is a concept of obligation
to fill a certain role as a Dutch citizen. As Joyce Hamilton explains, that concept can
sometimes be more implicit and subconscious than readily true:
Tolerance of diversity, also having progressive policy on euthanasia, abortion, and LGBT politics
is part of that idea of a national identity, but I don’t think if you would ask the average Dutch
person on the street that they would come up with that answer.

Whether the right-wing believes there is a formulated Dutch identity that is being
challenged, or whether that same identity is still in the process of being incorporated, the
sense of urgency and necessity to polarize using the gay community as the poster-child,
or “real Dutch” as Duyvendak labels them, remains constant. So, we can conclude that,
yes, indeed the right-wing is taking the gay community and utilizing their status to help
prove another concept that they are trying to assert regarding the immigrant community.
At this point, to attempt to understand if that move is opportunistic, it is important to
make an assessment of how fairly the right-wing represents this aversion of the gay and
migrant communities towards each other.
During the interviews, I posed the question of whether or not the threat to the gay
community from migrants, in how the right-wing describes it, was “overblown”; the
underlying assumption here was that if there was a good case to be made that the threat
was understood as inflated, it would be easier to conclude a lack of a sincerity and an
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indication of blatant opportunism on the part of those presenting the threat. According to
Professor David Bos, the threat should be seen as opportunistic because it is specifically
used as a way to tap into latent xenophobia regarding immigration. In a way, negative
viewpoints had historically been suppressed about migrants, but now “people experience
a sense of liberation that finally they are free to say what they really feel.” When the
COC member Joyce Hamilton was posed this question, interestingly enough she
responded:
If you look at the numbers, the statistics, only half the people doing the gay-bashing are from
Migrant backgrounds and the other half are white, natural Dutch citizens… and you need to
remember that these people from Migrant backgrounds are in worse socio-economic situations
than the average Dutch natural citizens. This issue is being pushed too much into the corner of
cultural or religious causes as motivations people would have for gay bashing… There’s quite a
large portion of the Migrant community which is being stereotyped in themselves, and that’s
where the tension grows.

In short, it was very surprising to hear a member of the COC articulate this kind of
thought. Not only did she make the assertion that the situation was being misrepresented,
but she also made a very important observation about how what she sees as the
misrepresentation of facts was able to function into a perpetuation of the problem. Since,
most of the people I interviewed were in fact gay, I was expecting that one of them would
have had an unpleasant experience with discrimination which would shed light on this
polarized situation and put a human face on gay-bashing for me, as Jan Willem
Duyvendak bravely recalled:
The [gay-bashing] situation is a LITTLE overblown. I still worry a lot about the gay bashing and
the violence against gays and lesbians. I have been bashed twice, but that's a long time ago and
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both instances were by Moroccan guys, so I’m not naive, I know very well what it is to be bashed
and to get beaten up, so I do at first take it very seriously; but the vast majority of the Muslims do
not use violence against gay people, and there is quite a group that is open and is growing and is
open to modernizing their opinions, and we should be strategic about it, we should think about
how we are to invite them to get a more positive view.

To hear a man who was twice victimized and was still be able to retain a calm approach
and logically deduce that his assailants represent a minority of their cultural group was
incredible. In general, all of my respondents answered this question with the same sense
that the situation is being misrepresented to the Dutch electorate and that, through this
misrepresentation, the gay community is being used to polarize with and ostracize the
migrant communities. Also, it is important to understand that all of my respondents were
somewhat left-wing academics and professionals, mostly gay, and would be expected not
to ever downplay a threat which is very real to all of them.
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Conclusion

The New Dutch “Pets”

In general when trying to understand and make educated realizations regarding
ongoing social interactions the most difficult assessment is the gauging of sincerity. In
terms of my project specifically, the only way to truly judge opportunism and reach a
definitive, concrete conclusion would be an admission of opportunistic goals on behalf of
the right-wing aligning behind the gay movement; clearly that is a fantastical
impossibility. Already, these parties operate under the guise that they are representing
genuine sentiment; the objective of this study was to be able to make an educated
assessment of that guise and be able to defend that argument through legitimate research.
To be brief, this was an illogical and impossible outcome which can probably never be
achieved. That said, despite inherent shortcomings in the research, the first half of this
conclusion intends to report the case to be made either for or against surmising
opportunism on the part of the right-wing parties. The second and more important half
intends to discuss how my initial research objectives spawn an even more important
question surrounding the same subject.
In the November 21, 2007 ‘Out in the Netherlands’ discussion panel which was
convened in order to discuss pressing issues for the Dutch gay community, professor
David Bos briefly addressed the issue of right-wing parties aligning behind the gay
movement as an instance where the Dutch gay community was being treated as Dutch
“pets”. Initially, this seemed like a very bold way to characterize the political alignment
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behind the gay movement, yet it does still run in unison with the suspicion that this
political alignment is opportunistic, and in a sense, the gay community is being used.
When asked for her reaction to this description of the Dutch gay community as pets,
Joyce Hamilton responded, “Yes, totally, I mean there’s a difference when you look at
the different parties, but totally, that is a good of way describing it, that [right-wing
parties] use the gay community as a pet, the Dutch pet”. In general, I asked the majority
of my interview subjects and people I know socially how they felt about this very
agitated description and nearly every person had the same reaction: an immediate laugh, a
brief pause, and thoughtful consent to the rhetoric. It seems as if, in a very basic, nonacademic way there is a consensus that the gay community is being used by right-wing
parties to further an anti-migrant policy agenda.
Through the research and the interviews conducted in this report, it is safe to
conclude that the knowledge base contained in this ISP all strongly supports the notion
that these right-wing parties are to some extent opportunistic. Looking at the empirical
facts, this case is made through a few basic realities. For one, the reality that support for
a gay agenda is so recent and that some of these parties show patterns of tolerance rather
than acceptance does seem to contradict the fervor with which they support a gay agenda.
Further, the fact that the issue of polarizing the Muslim community and ostracisizing
them seems to take priority to accurately representing the true threat to gays in the
Netherlands is even more troublesome. Also, it is imperative to synthesize these two
facts with the key reality that it is politically advantageous to be in favor of gay rights, as
a majority of the voting electorate seems to represent that view. Another key fact is that
the gay community is a very readily available tool to use in order to create a polarity
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between the concepts of “Islam” and “Dutch” within the public discourse in the
Netherlands.
In short, this conclusion, that indeed it seems this alignment behind the gay
movement is opportunistic, was deduced from research from a specific knowledge base.
As clarified in the assumptions and limitations portion of this paper, it is impossible for
me to represent the data and conclusions of my research without recognizing that it is
inescapably marred by the inherent biases of the people I spoke with. That said, I do not
believe that there were any other perspectives which I was denied access to nor were
there any that I neglected in my research, and in terms of evaluating the contributors to
this study, I could not have desired a more objective group of experts through which to
help me understand these political phenomena. With that said, it is through the synthesis
of their contributions and my own personal analysis that a conclusion was reached which
articulates that in fact there is a compelling case to be made that the political right in the
Netherlands is acting in a manner that could be described as opportunistic. That is to say,
their methods and manner of mobilizing support and framing the discussion, in terms of
the issue of Islam and homosexuality, can most certainly be described as being
disingenuous at times. However, it is imperative to realize that this question, of whether
or not these parties are acting out of opportunism, is largely irrelevant in the current
context.
At the outset of this study, the underlying suspicion that motivated the initial
inquiry into this subject was that these political groups were in fact disingenuous and
opportunistic. Beyond that, the continued application of that initial assumption leads the
conclusion that, if opportunism is the case, that this is a negative thing which can hurt the
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gay community. There was the underlying assumption that opportunism and
misrepresented intentions would somehow end in a negative consequence for the larger
gay Dutch community. In large part, the relevant motives behind this move of the rightwing political parties are not yet and may never be understood; the more relevant
question, at this specific point in time, is what implications this specific and definable
move by the right-wing holds for both the migrant and gay communities in the
Netherlands.
From the perspective of the gay community, the important question must be asked,
“What are the consequences, both short-term and long-term for the gay community
which stem from the support of right-wing parties”? At this point, the motives which
inform the decisions and positions are irrelevant and inconsequential in the short-term –
only the actions seem to matter. So in the short-term, there are both positive and negative
consequences. In terms of positive consequences, since the gay community is invoked
with inclusivity to the greater Dutch population, the gay community is seen as a posterchild of the Dutch in some aspects, and the protection of their rights is the entire basis for
the discourse. Harkening back to the initial reference to group identity formation, it is
logical to understand that these are very beneficial instances of acceptance and
confirmation for the gay community; these are all good things which have important,
tangible, and positive results in the immediate social reality. In terms of the short-term,
currently there are no true, immediate consequences in terms of the realignment of the
right-wing behind their agenda.
In the long-term, there are perceived positive benefits of this phenomenon. In a
sense, we can characterize the gay movement in the Netherlands as no longer the left-
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wing, progressive movement it started as. The movement has become normalized and
integrated within the larger Dutch context, and while many will argue that this is a
negative reality, it is very difficult to ignore the fact that this process of integration and
normalization already has and will continue to have positive material benefits by opening
up traditionally non-gay-friendly spaces, specifically in more traditional, conservative,
right-wing places, for a gay person to exist peacefully. Despite some of the
incogruencies between the ideology of traditional right-wing rhetoric and traditional gay
emancipation rhetoric, let us examine the example of the young gay child growing up in
an Orthodox protestant family for example. Traditionally, coming out of the closet
would be a nightmare and maybe an impossibility for a child growing up and out of that
type of background. With the marriage of gay emancipation to nearly all degrees of the
political spectrum, regardless of how tarnished the original left-wing message becomes in
this process, the life of that child is unarguably made easier. That child’s living
environment is undeniably made more accepting, even if just on a superficial level,
towards his/her gay identity. This truth about the process of normalization and the
integration of gay emancipation to the wider society is clearly making traditionallyunfriendly spaces now friendlier to the gay community, specifically to its members who
experienced a much harsher and miserable sense of exile. For that reason alone, the
opening of more and more spaces, it nearly seems like the question of right-wing motives
is still irrelevant; the argument goes, “Since the material results seem to be furthering
positive goals for the gay community and are not currently hurting the movement in the
immediate present, and in the long-term there is promise for creating more acceptance in
traditionally unfriendly spaces, who cares what these right-wingers really think?”.
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However, it is somewhat troublesome to think about the future without
considering the true motives of these right-wing supporters. It makes logical sense that
this adoption of a gay agenda by the right-wing is creating a positive reality in the lives of
gays in traditionally conservative environments without hindering the rights or
jeopardizing the left-wing environment of gays either; however, there is a case to be
made that this current phenomenon, which largely pits Muslims and Dutch against one
another because of gays, could pose a threat in the future.
It is important to understand that the current empirical data shows that, despite the
fact that immigration has largely abated, the migrant communities in the Netherlands,
Amsterdam specifically, are growing in size and the trend indicates that they will
continue to do so (Mattias Duyves Interview). As it seems right now, the overexaggerated conflict between Islam and ‘gay’ is polarizing and ostracizing a large amount
of the migrant communities, many of whom might not even have an aversion to
homosexuality otherwise. In essence, this current phenomenon is creating a growing
number of people who see their lives as unfairly difficult and who understand their own
discrimination as the result of this catalyzing issue: homosexuality. For the gay
community, this is an extremely dangerous and troublesome trend, not only because it is
unfair to the current group of migrants which is ostracized but because that group is
growing and could eventually be sizeable and powerful enough to react in a negative
manner towards the future gay community in the Netherlands.
In essence I do stipulate that opportunism, on the part of these right-wing parties,
is not a foregone conclusion, it is debatable and while this study does find the argument
for these right-wing parties being opportunistic more compelling, that is still a very
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subjective conclusion. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the right-wing is siding, for
whatever reasons, with the most popular stance, supporting gay rights, and is thus acting
accordingly. As a result of this, we see the growth of a community who is being
continually ostracized and discriminated with the issue of homosexuality as the tangible
discriminating factor. At this point in the analysis, it is important to reexamine the
theoretical basis upon which this study is built. The theories of Coser and group identity
formation will support the assertion that the gay community is strengthened and
seemingly a more cohesive member of the current larger Dutch society simply through
the inclusive rhetoric they are characterized with. However, a cognizance to the power of
rhetoric and semantics in the vein of post-modern ideology suggests that the implications
of applying the label “deviant” or “backwards” affect an organically changing makeup of
Dutch society. Hypothetically, the data logically points towards the truth that, if the
current trends continue, this migrant community will one day be as sizeable in population
as the current “native-Dutch” whites (Mattias Duyves). Also, if the current realities of
discrimination persist, we can expect this increasing population of migrant people to
continue to feel ostracized because of homosexuality. It is at this point that the question
of right-wing motive will become particularly relevant. It currently seems that a day is
fast approaching where these migrants will no longer be bullied and may possibly seek
retribution, and it is only logical that they will seek it from the gay community. On that
day, the real question begs, will these same supporters of gay rights who now jeopardize
their future still care about what happens to them?
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Appendix: Broad Organic Interview Guide

In terms of interviews, it is important to note that the questions I asked each of the
six people I spoke with were contantly evolving and changing. I did cherry-pick the
questions based upon time restraints and interviewee expertise. This questionnaire guide
presents all of the perspectives which I delved into through my interview research.
1. The American right-wing is characterized by a lack of concern with minority
rights, specifically the gay community
a. Who specifically are the right-wing parties who are linked to the COC and
gay rights in the Netherlands
i. Specifically, how is that link manifested (cosponsored bills,
alliances between specific persons, similarly stated positions by
persons and parties, etc.)?
b. How are these parties different from American right-wingers, what social
climate permits a right-wing community in the Netherlands to be able to
get behind an agenda of gay-rights?
i. How is it that gay rights can be linked to a right-wing movement in
today’s Netherlands, more specifically, how did the movement
shift from the political left to the right?
c. What are the stated reasons, by these right-wing factions for supporting
gay rights
d. What are the believed opportunities through this alliance, what does either
side believe they can accomplish through this alliance
e. To what extent, if any, are Muslim immigrant desires and needs hindered
by this alliance
2. Some gay rights activists assert that while there have been numerous advances for
the gay community, that a large number of the Dutch population (not including
recent immigrants) do still hold a lot of reservations about the moral aspects of
homosexuality
a. Do right-wing parties feel that it is politically pragmatic to support a gayrights agenda? Why or why not?
b. Does the right-wing see supporting gay-rights as a moral issue in any
sense? Specifically, is supporting gay rights the “right thing to do”, in the
eyes of the right-wing?
c. If it were the case that supporting gay-rights was not politically
advantageous for the right-wing, would those parties aligning behind the
gay movement opt to change their stance?
d. To what extent is the homosexual community seen as a part of Dutch
society, are they accepted, not accepted, or not seen as an important point
of discussion?
i. To what extent does the alliance between right-wing factions and
the homosexual community affirm either group’s sense of selfidentity
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3. Clearly the homosexual community is seen as somewhat endangered or threatened
by Muslim immigrants
a. In General, how do these aforementioned right-wing parties feel about
immigration? Has this stance changed in recent years?
b. Can religiously and culturally encouraged attitudes of Muslim immigrants
coincide with traditionally manifested truths about Dutch society?
c. Does immigration pose any threat to the larger Dutch community beyond
the apparent rift between the immigrant community and the gay
community?
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